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INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE
CASE CONCERNING CULTURAL PROPERTY
AND THE ARMENIAN GENOCIDE
(UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. REPUBLIC
OF TURKEY)
APPLICATION FOR THE INSTITUTION OF
PROCEEDINGS OF THE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA
INTRODUCTION
The United States of America brings this Application against the
Republic of Turkey under the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Genocide Convention)1 to establish
the international responsibility of the Republic of Turkey for certain acts of
genocide targeting Armenians.2 By this Application, the United States asks
the International Court of Justice (ICJ) to declare the Republic of Turkey
responsible for these acts and to ensure that the cultural rights of Armenian
citizens of the Republic of Turkey are fully respected and protected. Article
IX of the Genocide Convention establishes the jurisdiction of the ICJ to
resolve all legal disputes between state parties arising under the Genocide
Convention. The ICJ has found that states can be liable for genocide acts
under the Genocide Convention.'
The Republic of Turkey is responsible for genocidal acts perpetrated
after 1948 that are part of the iterative genocide aimed at the elimination of
the Armenian people from the Republic of Turkey. In particular, the
1. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9, 1948;
102 Stat. 3045, 78 U.N.T.S 277 [hereinafter the Genocide Convention].
2. The United States government has argued before the ICJ that the "Turkish massacres of
Armenians" are an "outstanding exampl[e] of the crime of genocide." See WILLIAM A. SCHABAS,
GENOCIDE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 19 (2 ed. 2009).
3. The Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide (Bosnia and Herzigovina v. Serbia and Montenegro). 2007 I.C.J. 62, 68 (Feb. 26).
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Republic of Turkey has purposefully pursued the destruction and neglect of
the Armenian cultural patrimony within the Turkish Republic. The goal of
this policy is the formation of a homogenous Turkish cultural identity and
nationalist narrative that will strengthen the Turkish state. This is a
continuation of the eliminationist policies of the Ottoman Empire begun as
early as 1870. Born of the perceived need to save and strengthen the
Turkish state by destroying its enemies, these policies have led to the near
elimination of ethnic Armenians and Armenian culture from the Republic
of Turkey.
By its accession to the Genocide Convention, the Republic of Turkey
has undertaken "to prevent and punish" genocidal acts committed in war
time or in peace time.4 The Republic of Turkey is the successor state to the
Ottoman Empire in more ways than one. It has continued the Ottoman
Empire's program of genocide against the Armenians, and by doing so has
violated its obligations under the Genocide Convention. The United States
asks the Court to find that the Republic of Turkey has effected the
destruction of the following five Armenian cultural sights: the Church of St.
Sarkiss in the province of Kars, the Church of Holy Ejmiacin at Soradir, the
Cathedral of the Holy Apostles in Kars, the Armenian Cathedral of Ani, and
the Cathedral of Aghtamar.
This Application instituting proceedings before the Court will set out
the facts which lie behind the legal dispute between the United States and
Turkey, the subject of the dispute, and the legal theory which forms the
basis of the United States' Application.
FACTS
The goal of this section is to demonstrate that the Armenians of the
Ottoman Empire and Republic of Turkey have been subjected to acts of
genocide for over 140 years. This campaign waxes and wanes in its
ferocity. But its goal is always the same: the elimination of Armenians and
Armenian culture from the Turkish state.
To understand the genocidal acts committed against the Armenian
citizens of the Republic of Turkey, it is necessary to understand something
of the structure and history of the Ottoman Empire.5 First, two Ottoman
institutions are of particular importance for understanding the facts
surrounding the plight of the Armenians: the millet system and the
Capitulations. Second, four important historical events concerning the
4. Id. at 152.
5. The Republic of Turkey is a successor state to the Ottoman Empire. See Treaty of Peace
with Turkey Signed at Lausanne, Jul. 24, 1923, 28 L.N.T.S. 11 (1924) [hereinafter Treaty of
Lausanne] (recognizing the new Turkish Republic as the successor state to the Ottoman Empire).
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Armenian Problem6 will be discussed: the Russo-Ottoman War 1877-1878,
the Hamidian Massacres, the Final Solution of 1915-1917, and the adoption
of problematic cultural heritage policies by the Republic of Turkey after
World War II. The following treatment of these institutions and historical
events is not thorough but is sufficient to put the relevant facts in the proper
context.
I. STRUCTURE: Two IMPORTANT OTTOMAN INSTITUTIONS
The millet system. The Ottoman Empire was made up of people from
many religions and of many nationalities,7 but the dominant culture and the
state religion of the Ottoman Empire was Islam.' Muslims enjoyed full
rights of citizenship whilst non-Muslims-referred to as dhimmi-did not.9
The legal status of the dhimmi is founded on the Koran's Ninth Sura, which
reads, "Fight against such of those who have been given the Scripture as
believe not in Allah nor the Last Day, and follow not the Religion of Truth,
until they pay tribute readily, being brought low."'" In exchange for living
under the protection of a Muslim state, dhimmi were "obligated to display
subservience and loyalty to the Muslim order and to pay a tax known as the
jizya."' "The relationship [was] not one of equals, but one of tolerance and
forbearance." 2
The inequality between Muslims and non-Muslims in the Ottoman
Empire can be seen in numerous ways. For example, the Ottoman Empire
organized its dhimmi population by religion or sect. These groups were
known as millets. Each millet administered "not only the clerical, ritual, and
charitable affairs of their flocks, but also education and the regulations of
matter of personal status like marriage, divorce, guardianship, and
inheritance."' 3 Dhimmi had to wear certain colors assigned to their millets
and refrain from wearing valuable materials. 4 Additionally, they were
prohibited from building their houses higher than those of Muslims, riding
horses, and conducting religious observances in a way that would disturb
6. The Armenian Problem, sometimes called the Eastern Question, refers to the problems of
the Armenian Christians during the final days of the Ottoman Empire.
7. TANER AK(AM, A SHAMEFUL ACT: THE ARMENIAN GENOCIDE AND THE QUESTION OF
TURKISH RESPONSIBILITY 20 (Paul Bessemer trans., Metropolitan Books 2006) (1999).
8. Id.
9. Dhimmi rights were limited to protection from violence and depredation. Id., at 22.
10. KORAN, SURA 9:29; see BERNARD LEWIS, THE JEWS OF ISLAM 14 (Princeton University
Press 1984).
11. See generally CHRISTIANS AND JEWS IN THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE: THE FUNCTIONING OF
A PLURAL SOCIETY (Benjamin Braude & Bernard Lewis eds., 1982).
12. AKcAM, supra note 7, at 23.
13. RODERIC DAVIDSON, REFORM IN THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE, 1856-1876 13 (Princeton
University Press 1963).
14. AKCAM, supra note 7, at 24 (citing BINSWANGER, OSMANISCHEN REICH 165).
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Muslims.15 Dhimmi were also discouraged from living in Muslims areas of
towns. 6 The pluralism of the Ottoman Empire was built upon debasement
and toleration.
The Capitulations. The Capitulations were a body of agreements
between the Ottoman Empire and foreign states that formalized commercial
privileges" but eventually expanded to include numerous religious and
legal privileges. 8 These privileges were initially applicable only to France
and her allies, but foreign powers worked to extend them to non-Muslim
subjects of the Empire, particularly Christians.' 9 A good example of this is
the 1774 Kiichtik-Kainarji Treaty in which Russia contentiously claimed to
have been given protective rights over all Ottoman Orthodox Christians.2"
The Capitulations resulted in the Ottoman Christians becoming more
antagonistic and alienated from the Ottoman Empire,"1 causing Ottoman
authorities to become concerned about the survival of the empire. The
foreign powers used this struggle as "a pretext for interfering in internal
Ottoman affairs."22 From the late eighteenth century on, "wars between the
Ottomans and different European powers resulted in peace treaties that
brought significant privileges to Ottoman Christian subjects which, in turn,
paved the way for the eventual independence of these non-Muslim
communities."23
In response to the fracturing of their empire, Ottoman authorities began
a reorganization of the state that aimed to remove the inequality of the
millet system and to create a new form of Ottoman patriotism: the Tanzimat
reform.24 But the reality was that little appetite for equality existed among
Muslim Ottomans; the announced reforms appeared to be for foreign
consumption and were often not followed by action. The impotence of the
Tanzimat reforms stems from the fact that the concept of Christian-Muslim
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 25.
18. See Edgar Turlington, Treaty Relations with Turkey, 35 YALE L.J. 326, 331 (1926)
(citing Van Dyck, Report upon the Capitulations of the Ottoman Empire since the year 1150
Executive Document No. 3, Special Session of Congress (1881)).
19. See CHARLES WHITE, THREE YEARS IN CONSTANTINOPLE 139 (1864); see also AKCAM,
supra note 7, at 25-6 (discussing the extension of Capitulation privileges to Ottoman subjects).
The first such capitulation was concluded with the king of France in 1535. In 1673, King Louis
XIV signed an agreement with the Sultan Mehmet IV in which Louis became the "sole protector
of Christianity in the East."
20. J. KiRAKOSSiAN ARMAN, BRITISH DIPLOMACY AND THE ARMENIAN QUESTION, FROM
THE 1830S TO 1914 21 (The Gomidas Institute 2003) (1999).
21. AKiAM, supra note 7, at 27.
22. Id.
23. Id. (discussing the Serbian revolt of 1804).
24. IBER ORTAYLI, Tanzimat, TANZIMATTAN CUMHURIYETE TORKIYE ANSIKLPEDESI 1545
(1985).
25. DAVIDSON, supra note 13, at 45.
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equality "represented the most radical breach with ancient Islamic tradition
and was therefore most shocking to Muslim principles and good taste."26
Put another way, the concept of equality threatened the dominant status
Muslims had traditionally held within the Ottoman Empire.27 This caused
Muslims to regard non-Muslims, particularly Christians, with hostility.
Non-Muslim Ottomans were unenthusiastic about the state reforms of
1836-1876.28 Equality would require non-Muslims to give up the
established privileges accorded to them in the dhimma agreement. 9
"Although the Ottoman Christians may have wanted equality in theory, they
preferred in practice to pay a tax and so gain exemption from five years of
military service and possible death, and to devote their time to trade or
agriculture."3 In the absence of Ottoman Muslims, who were required to
lay down their lives for the empire, Ottoman Christians were easily able to
secure control of land and trade. 1 As Akgam notes, "it becomes easier to
understand why plans to create equality fostered the growth of hostility and
resentment in Ottoman society. '32
The hostility and resentment of Muslim Ottomans toward Christian
Ottomans during the nineteenth century found expression in Muslim
assaults and revolts against Christians.33 "From the late eighteenth century
through the nineteenth century, expulsion, outbreaks of mob violence, and
even massacres became increasingly frequent."34 The violence against
Armenians is best understood in the light of the aforementioned historical
background.
II. HISTORY: THE ARMENIAN QUESTION
The problem of the Armenian population in the Ottoman Empire
became an issue of international importance at the Berlin Conference
concluding the Russo-Ottoman War of 1877-1878.11 But decades before
becoming an international issue, the Armenians of Anatolia were subjected
to looting, murder, taxation irregularities, criminal behavior of government
26. BERNARD LEWIS, THE EMERGENCE OF MODERN TURKEY 107 (Oxford University Press
2d. ed. 1968. This reprint 1975) (1961).
27. AKi AM, supra note 7, at 32.
28. Id.
29. See FEROz AHMAD, ITTIHAT(CILIKTAN KEMALIZME 121 (1985).
30. ENVER ZIYA KARAL, 6 OSMANLI TARIHI 94 (1995).
31. DAVIDSON, supra note 13, at 106 n. 77.
32. AKiAM, supra note 7, at 33 (referencing DAVIDSON, supra note 11, at 106).
33. Id., at 34 (citing Lebanon in 1844, Mecca in 1855, Jeddah and Syria in 1858, and Serbia
in 1856-61).
34. LEWIS, supra note 8, at 168.
35. AKCAM, supra note 7, at 35. The Armenian population of the Ottoman Empire centered
around the Six Armenian Vilayets: Van, Erzurum, Mamfiretii'l-Aziz, Bitlis, Diyarbekir, and Sivas.
Collectively, these vilayets (provinces) were known as Western Armenia. See Armenia, World
Statesmen, available at http://www.worldstatesmen.org/Armenia.html.
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officials, and an inability to be witnesses at trials. 36 These problems were
assembled into a report by the Armenian Communal Council in 1870 and
submitted to the government.37 "Overall, the report, submitted to the
Ottoman government on 4 March 1872, summarized twenty years of
grievances, including 73 offenses during tax collection, 154 cases of abuse
of power by government officials, and 249 cases of kidnapping, robbery,
and illegally preventing religious functionaries from performing their
duties."38
A. The Russo-Ottoman War of 1877-1878
Following the Russo-Ottoman War of 1877-1878,39 the Armenian
population of the Ottoman Empire began to look to Russia for protection
against the "forced land seizures, profaning [of] churches and places of
worship, and in particular the forced conversion of women and children,
arson, protection extortion, rape and murder" frequently encountered by
Armenian Ottomans. a° As a result of Armenian Ottoman petitions, the
Russian government ensured the following article was added to the 1878
Preliminary Treaty of Peace Between Russian and Turkey signed at San
Stefano:
As the evacuation of the Russian troops of the territory which they
occupy in Armenia, and which is to be restored to Turkey, might
give rise to conflicts and complications detrimental to the
maintenance of good relations between the two countries, the
Sublime Porte engaged to carry into effect, without further delay,
the improvements and reforms demanded by local requirements in
the provinces inhabited by Armenians, and to guarantee their
security from Kurds and Circassians
This application of this provision of the peace treaty effectively made
Russia supervisor of the Armenian provinces of the Ottoman Empire.42 This
expansion of Russian power did not sit well with the other Great Powers,
who convened the 1878 Congress of Berlin to revise the San Stefano
Treaty. 43 The Congress of Berlin ended with the Sublime Porte offering
36. See YVES TERNON, ERMENI TABUSU 58-9 (1993).
37. E. URAs, TARIHTE ERMENILER VE ERMENI MESELESI 177 (Ankara 1987) (1950).
38. AKCAM, supra note 7, at 36 (citing YvEs TERNON, ERMENI TABUSU 58-9 (1993)).
39. Id. The Russo-Ottoman war was caused, in part, by the bloody suppression of uprising in
the Balkans between 1875-76. The Great Powers, angered by the ruthlessness of Ottomans,
interpreted the 1856 Paris Treaty as giving them the right to intervene in Ottoman affairs in order
to protect the interests of the empire's Christian populations.
40. URAS, supra note 37, at 178. Kurdish and Circassian gangs were often responsible for
terrorizing the Armenian Ottoman population.
41. Preliminary Treaty of Peace Between Russia and Turkey Signed at San Stefano, art. XVI.
See ARMAN, supra note 20, at 67.
42. AKCAM, supra note 7, at 38.
43. See Great Britain, 83 Parl. Papers 690-705 (1878)(providing English text of the 1878
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protection to the Armenian Ottomans but not to the extent found in the San
Stefano Treaty:
The Sublime Porte undertakes to carry out, without further delay,
the improvements and reforms demanded by the local requirements
in the provinces inhabited by the Armenians, and to guarantee their
security against the Circassians and Kurds. It will periodically make
known the steps taken to this effect to the Powers, who will
superintend their application. 44
Despite assurances to the contrary, the Ottoman authorities showed no
interest in implementing the reforms promised to their Armenian subjects.45
The intervention of the Great Powers caused Muslims to unite against
the perceived Christian threats:
[a]ctions taken since 1875 by both Balkan Christians and Christian
states in Europe to the detriment of Turkish and Muslim
populations had produced a sense of solidarity among the Muslims.
A good number of high Ottoman statesmen, Adbul Hamid II first
among them, advocated a foreign policy intended to preserve the
power of the state by tapping into this solidarity, a policy which
over time began to be known as Pan-Islamism."6
Thus, the Ottoman elite came to believe that the preservation of their
empire necessitated the solidarity of its Muslim populations"7 and the
elimination of the Christian forces hostile to it.4' This policy left Christian
communities, particularly the Armenian Ottomans, without the protection
promised them under the Berlin Treaty of 1878. 4 9 This abandonment added
momentum to a burgeoning Armenian nationalist movement that sought to
liberate Armenians from the Ottoman yoke." The Ottoman response to
Armenian demands for the protections promised them under the Berlin
Treaty was bloody and ruthless.
B. The Hamidian Massacres 1894-1896
The Hamidian Massacres refer to the killing of 80,000 to 300,000
Berlin Treaty); see also Vahakn N. Dadrian, Genocide as a Problem of National and International
Law: The World War I Armenian Case and Its Contemporary Legal Ramifications, 14 YLJ 221,
240 (1989).
44. Berlin Treaty, art. 61 (1878).
45. See generally CEVDET KO(7OK, OSMANLI DIPLOMASISINDE ERMENI MESELESININ
ORTAYA cIKI$1, 1878-1897 (1986).
46. KARAL, supra note 30, at 274.
47. AKCAM, supra note 7, at 40.
48. Id. at 44.
49. Id.
50. For example, the group Armenakan [Upiffhbmlluih llnLumlgntl]nth] was founded in
Van province in 1885 and was dedicated to Armenian independence.
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Armenian Ottomans5 between 1894 and 1896. They are named after Sultan
Abdul Hamid II, who had adopted a Pan-Islamist ideology in an attempt to
stop the "process of decline and collapse" of his empire.52 The Sultan
believed that his empire was faced "with the endless persecutions and
hostilities of the Christian world."" The goal of Sultan Abdul Hamid II's
policy was "for [Ottoman] Muslims to look upon attacks against Christians
as a fulfillment of a religious duty."54 Abdul Hamid II presided over what
the French vice-consul at Diyarbakir called the "gradual annihilat[ion] of
the Christian element."55
As noted above, an area of particular concern for the Sublime Porte was
its border with the Russian Empire. In November 1890, the Ottoman
government created irregular cavalry forces called the Hamidiye
Regiments. 6 These regiments consisted of Kurds from the Ottoman
provinces bordering the Russian Caucasus.5 7 While the official reason for
the formation of these regiments was to provide security along the Russian
border, Turkish sources have claimed that they were formed to terrorize
Armenian Ottomans. 8 Indeed, Sultan Abdul Hamid II is reported to have
said, "I tell you, I will soon settle those Armenians. I will give them a box
on the ears which will make them smart and relinquish their revolutionary
ambitions.""
The Hamidian Massacres broke out in 1894. The Armenian villagers of
Sasun revolted because they were forced to pay taxes to the Kurds in
addition to those owed to the Ottoman government.60 The villagers had
lodged a formal complaint with the authorities in Constantinople, which
found in the Armenians' favor; but the governor of the province incited the
local Muslim population to violence.6' At the same time, an Armenian
revolutionary organization called "Hunchak" encouraged the Armenian
51. There are various estimates for the number of Armenians killed during the Hamidian
Massacres. AK(AM, supra note 7, at 42 (citing German, French, and English reports along with
the claims of the Armenian partriarchate).
52. Id. at 43.
53. JOAN HASLIP, THE SULTAN: THE LIFE OF ABDUL HAMID 1211 (1973).
54. AKCAM, supra note 7, at 45.
55. StBASTIEN DE COURTOIS, THE FORGOTTEN GENOCIDE: EASTERN CHRISTIANS, THE
LAST ARAMEANS 138 (Vincent Aurora trans., Gorgias Press 2004) (citing Diplomatic Dispatch
#2, Vice-Consul at Diyarbakir, (Jan. 9, 1901)).
56. See AKCAM, supra note 7, at 40 (referencing MEHMET BAYRAK, KORTLER VE ULUSAL
DEMOKRATIK MOCADELELERI 61-73 (1993)(giving details of the Hamidiye Regmiments)).
57. Id. (referencing KENDAL NEZAN, Die Kurden unter den Osmanischen Herrschaft, in
KURDISTAN UND DIE KURDEN 61 (vol. 1, Gerard Chaliand ed. 1988)).
58. Id. (referencing ORHAN KOLO6LU, ABDULHAMIT GERQE I 337 (1987)).
59. AKCAM, supra note 7, at 40 (citing JOAN HASLIP, THE SULTAN: LIFE OF ABDUL HAMID
II (1973)).
60. Id. at41.
61. See VAHAKN N. DADRIAN, THE HISTORY OF THE ARMENIAN GENOCIDE: ETHNIC
CONFLICT FROM THE BALKANS TO ANATOLIA TO THE CAUCASUS 114ff (1995).
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Sasun villagers to rise up.62 The Ottoman authorities savagely suppressed
the Armenian uprising, killing many," and leading the Great Powers to
force the Sultan into accepting a program of reform.'
This reform program called for the Sublime Porte to reign in the
Hamidian Regiments, but, like all the attempts at reform to date, it was
ineffective.65 Instead the result was a series of systematic massacres of
Armenian Ottomans in the Anatolian regions of Zeytun, Trabzon, Erzurum,
Bitlis, Van, Harput, Diyarbakir, Sivas, and Cukurova.66 A particularly
appalling incident occurred in December 1895 in the city of Urfa. Eight
thousand Armenians were killed in forty-eight hours,67 three thousand of
whom were burned to death in Urfa's Armenian Cathedral.68 This brutality,
along with other pogroms, led the Austrian ambassador to the Sublime
Porte to report that Muslim Ottomans were engaging in a "Muslim
Crusade. ' '69
The British embassy dragoman" at the time summarized his
understanding of the situation by referring to the cultural justification for
killing Armenians:
[The Muslims] are guided by the prescriptions of the Shari'a. The
law prescribes that if the "rayay," or cattle, Christians try, through
their recourse to foreign powers, to overstep the privileges allowed
them by their Mussulman masters and free themselves from their
oppression, their lives and property are forfeited, and they are at the
mercy of the Mussulmans. To the Turkish mind, the Armenians
tried to overstep those limits by appealing to the foreign powers,
especially England. They therefore consider it their religious duty
and a righteous thing to destroy... the Armenians .... 71
This sentiment is echoed by Yusuf Kemal Tengirsenk, who was a member
of the investigative commission of the Ottoman parliament after the Adana
Massacres of 190972 and later the second foreign minister of the Republic of
62. AKCAM, supra note 7, at 41.
63. Id. (referencing KARAL, supra note 30, vol. 8 at 138 (citing the memoirs of Kfmil Papa)).
64. Id.
65. Id. (referencing URtAS, supra note 37, at 297-326 (comparing the proposals of reform
with those accepted by the Sublime Porte)).
66. See generally DADRIAN, supra note 61.
67. V.N. Dadrian, Introduction, in EPHRAIM K. JERNAZIAN, JUDGMENT UNTO TRUTH:
WITNESSING THE ARMENIAN GENOCIDE 3 (trans. Alice Haig, 1990).
68. Id.
69. AKCAM, supra note 7, at 44 (citing Report, in HAUS-, HOF-, UND STAATSARCHIV
[hereinafter "HHStA"], BELOHNUNGSAKTEN [hereinafter "BA"] 413, A Ic, Constantinople, (Oct.
11, 1896)).
70. "Dragoman" is the title given to translators and intermediaries between different ethnic
groups in the Ottoman Empire.
71. AKCAM, supra note 7, at45 (quoting FO/195/1930 (Folio 34/187) as quoted in DADRIAN,
supra note 43, at 243).
72. An estimated 15-20 million Armenians died in the Adana Massacre of 1909. It is argued
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Turkey. He said, "I am of the opinion that the great majority truly believed
that their government, their lives, and their religion were under threat."73
C. The Final Solution of 1915-1917
The genocide of 1915-1917 consisted of forced conversions, the
destruction of cultural property, and deportations, which turned into
massacres.74  The deportations, massacres, and forced conversions
comprised a concerted effort by the Committee of Union and Progress to
settle the Eastern Question.75 This is confirmed by the testimony of Vehip
Papa, commander of the Ottoman Third Army in 1916:
These atrocities, committed according to a clear program and with
absolute intent, were carried out at the orders and supervision of
first, members of the Union and Progress Central Committee, and
second, by leading members of government who, by casting aside
law and conscience, served as tools for the designs of the
Committee.76
Furthermore, Vehip Papa described how government officials knew of these
atrocities and did nothing to prevent them.77 As a result, between 800,000
and 1.5 million Armenians were killed.78 The Ottoman government, in its
1918-1919 investigation7 9 of the genocide, set the death count at 800,000.80
Prominent Turkish historian Y. H. Bayur has said that 800,000 must be
considered an accurate figure.8'
Before 1915, massacres of Armenian Ottomans were not an empire-
wide policy, rather localized events designed to strengthen the empire's
Islamic identity.8" The genocidal acts of 1915-1917 had a different purpose,
a purpose that escalated the eliminationist program. Taldt Papa-one of the
that the tremendous wealth and prosperity of Armenians in this region reversed the traditional
Muslim non-Muslim social arrangements. Id at 69.
73. Id. at 46 (citing YUSUF KEMAL TENGIRSENK, VATAN HITZMETINDE 120 (1981)).
74. Idat 174.
75. Id. at 153 (citing a recorded statement of Dr. Nazim recorded during the post-war
indictment of Committee leaders. First Session, Main Indictment, Takvim- i Vekdyi, no. 3540 (27
Nisan 1335/27 April 1919)).
76. Id. at 154 (citing the testimony of Vehip Pasa, Dec. 5, 1918).
77. Id.
78. This is the number of victims generally accepted by the international community.
DICTIONARY OF GENOCIDE 19 (Samuel Totten, Paul Robert Bartrop & Steven L. Jacobs eds.,
2008). The actual number of deaths is a controversial topic. See Sarkis J. Karajian, An Inquiry into
the Statistics of the Turkish Genocide of the Armenians, 1915-1918 25 ARMENIAN REVIEW 25
(Winter 1972), cited in AKCAM, supra note 7, at 183, n. 217.
79. This commission was established by Interior Minister Mustafa Arif Defpner in December
of 1918. AKCAM, supra note 7, at 183.
80. This finding of fact was announced by the Ottoman Interior Minister Cemal Bey on
March 18, 1919. Id.
81. Id. (citing Y.H. BAYUR, TURK iNKLILABI TARIHI 787 (vol 3, pt. 4 1983)).
82. Id. at 47.
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leaders of the Committee of Union and Progress83 that controlled the
Ottoman Empire during World War I-stated that the attacks on Armenian
Ottomans starting in 1915 were aimed at "a complete and fundamental
elimination of this concern.""
This "final solution" was the result of an intellectual commitment to
Turkish nationalism, an ideology that suffused the Committee of Union and
Progress during the war years." This version of Turkish nationalism was
built on the notion that Ottoman Muslims were "superior to... other
peoples and nations, and therefore possessed the inherent right to rule over
them."86 This ideology is similar to that set out in Islamic culture and could
be explained by Bernard Lewis's observation that "[a]mong the different
peoples who embraced Islam, none went farther in sinking their separate
identity in the Islamic community than the Turks."87 Thus, what it meant to
be Turkish was heavily influenced by what it meant to be a Muslim.88
Like Pan-Islamism, Turkish nationalism was a response to uncertainty
over the future of the Ottoman Empire.89 Like Pan-Islamism, Turkish
nationalism sought explanations for the empire's decline.9" And, like Pan-
Islamism, those explanations appeared to center on the Christian minorities
and their struggle for civil and political rights.9 The Committee of Union
and Progress saw it as their special and sacred duty to heal the empire's
wounds and to eliminate "anyone, regardless of who they were, who
seemed an obstacle to its sacred calling. '92 Turkish historians have
described this mindset as having "influenced the decisions and behavior of
the Unionists in events such as the Armenian deportations." 93 This political
ideology, espoused by the Ottoman government, led one of the postwar
Istanbul war-crimes trial courts 94 to say that the decision to massacre
Armenians was made by the Central Committee for Union and Progress and
83. The Committee of Union and Progress was a political party associated with the Young
Turk Revolution in 1908. It came to power in 1913 in a coup d'etat.
84. AKQAM, supra note 7, at 47. (citing Talit Pasa's letter of May 26, 1915 to the Grand
Vizier).
85. Id.
86. Id. at 48. This "ruling nation" concept is very much influenced by Islamic ideas.
87. Id. (quoting BERNARD LEWIS, THE EMERGENCE OF MODERN TURKEY 329 (2d ed.
1968)).
88. Cf AKCAM, supra note 7, at 50.
89. Id. at 55.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 58.
93. Id. at 59 (quoting SINA AKSIN JON TORKLER VE I-rrIHAT VE TERAKKI 159 (1987)).
94. After World War I, the Ottoman government tried certain members of the Committee of
Union and Progress for atrocities committed during the Armenian Genocide. See generally TANER
AKCAM, ARMENIEN UND DER VOLKERMORD: DIE ISTANBULER PROZESSE UND DIE TURKISCHE
NATIONALBEWEGUNG 185 (1996).
United States ofAmerica v. Republic of Turkey
conveyed to the provinces by special couriers.95
The deported Armenians were taken from "areas far removed from the
war zone directly into the theater of operations, from inner Anatolia to the
front96 where the Fourth and Sixth Armies were fighting the British. ' 97 At
no point during the deportation were any provisions made for transporting
tens of thousands of people.98 No help in the form of food, money, or other
basic necessities were given; 99 thousands died of starvation on the
roadside. °0 The Ottoman governor-general of Aleppo attempted to provide
housing to deported Armenians, but was rejected by officials in
Constantinople.'0 The Ottoman government insisted that the Armenians be
moved to the Syrian and Iraqi deserts.'0 2
In certain areas, Ottoman authorities forcibly converted Armenians to
Islam.' °3 The German consul at Samsun reported that "all the Armenian
villages in and around Samsun had been Islamicized."' Contemporaneous
reports from Erzurum, Trabzon, and Adana contained similar news.'05
Those Armenians who converted were spared;0 6 those who did not were
forcibly expelled from their homes.'07
The final solution included the destruction of many Armenian cultural
properties, like the ancient monasteries of Varagavank and Khtskonk. l0 8
Indeed,
[d]uring the years 1915-23, a period of eight years, some 1,000
Armenian churches and monasteries were leveled to the ground
95. AKYAM, supra note 7, at 154 (referencing Tercimant Hakikat (Aug. 5, 1920)).
96. The front in question was in the Syrian and Iraqi Deserts.
97. AKCAM, supra note 7, at 184 (citing Qerkez Hasan, Peki Yiizbinlerce Ermeniyi Kim
Olduirdui? [ "Well, then, who did kill hundreds of thousands of Armenians? "], in ALEMDAR (April
5, 1919)).
98. Id. (citing Scheubner-Richter's report that Tashin Bey, governor-general of Erzurum, had
asked to delay the deportation until the road security could be established but was turned down by
Third Army commander Mahmut Kdmil Pasha. Reports by Consul Schneuber-Richter (Erzurum),
German Foreign Office, in POLITICAL ARCHIVE [hereinafter "PA-AA"], Bo. Kons./B. 169 and R
14088 (June 22, and Aug. 5, 1915)).
99. Id. at 185 (citing Report by Ambassador Wangenheim, in PA-AA/R 14086 (June 17,
1915)).
100. Id. at 174.
101. Id. (citing Halep Valisi Celal'in Anilan in VAKIT (Dec. 12, 1918)).
102. AKCAM, supra note 7, at 177 (referencing Report by Ambassador Hohenlohe, in PA-
AA/Bo. Kons./B. 170 (Sept. 16, 1915)).
103. Id. at 175.
104. Id. (quoting PA-AA/R 14086, Appendix to Report by Ambassador Wangenheim, (July
16, 1915)).
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. This monastery was destroyed in 1915 by Ottoman forces. It was an important place of
pilgrimage because it contained a piece of the True Cross. See Dickran Kouymjian, Haig & Isabel
Berberian Professor of Armenian Studies, Cal. State Univ., Fresno, Holocaust Lecture Series:
When Does Genocide End? The Armenian Case (Mar. 11, 2003).
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while nearly 700 other religious structures were half-destroyed. The
city of Van is a good example of this. Four years after the genocide
the historic city was completely gone, that is except for a few ruins
such as those of a part of one Armenian church. 109
D. The Adoption of Problematic Cultural Property Laws by the Republic
of Turkey
Cultural property is defined as,
[P]roperty which, on religious or secular grounds, is specifically
designated by each State as being of importance for archaeology,
prehistory, history, literature, art or science and which belongs to
the following categories: (a) Rare collections and specimens of
fauna, flora, minerals and anatomy, and objects of palaeontological
[sic] interest; (b) property relating to history, including the history
of science and technology and military and social history, to the life
of national leaders, thinkers, scientists and artist and to events of
national importance; (c) products of archaeological excavations
(including regular and clandestine) or of archaeological discoveries;
(d) elements of artistic or historical monuments or archaeological
sites which have been dismembered; (e) antiquities more than one
hundred years old, such as inscriptions, coins and engraved seals;
(f) objects of ethnological interest; (g) property of artistic interest,
such as: (i) pictures, paintings and drawings produced entirely by
hand on any support and in any material (excluding industrial
designs and manufactured articles decorated by hand); (ii) original
works of statuary art and sculpture in any material; (iii) original
engravings, prints and lithographs; (iv) original artistic assemblages
and montages in any material; (h) rare manuscripts and incunabula,
old books, documents and publications of special interest
(historical, artistic, scientific, literary, etc.) singly or in collections;
(i) postage, revenue and similar stamps, singly or in collections; (j)
archives, including sound, photographic and cinematographic
archives; (k) articles of furniture more than one hundred years old
and old musical instruments." 0
This is the official United Nations (UN) definition taken from the 1970
UNESCO Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the
Illicit Import, Export and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property. As is
readily seen, the list of things that constitute cultural property is very large
109. Id. at 10.
110. United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization [UNESCO] Convention
on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and Transfer of Ownership
of Cultural Property [hereinafter UNESCO Convention], art. 1, Nov. 14, 1970, 823 U.N.T.S. 231
(1972).
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and diverse. The power to control these properties is, in some sense, the
power to control the past, and, perhaps, the present.
i. The International Framework
The UN has the following purposes: 1) to maintain international peace
and security; 2) to develop friendly relations among nations based on
respect for the principles of equal rights and self-determination of peoples,
and to take other appropriate measures to strengthen universal peace; 3) to
achieve international co-operation in solving international problems of an
economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character, and in promoting and
encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all
without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion; and 4) to be a
center for harmonizing the actions of nations in the attainment of common
ends. "'
In 1970, the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural
Organization (UNESCO) drafted a convention designed to prevent the
illegal transfers of cultural property, the Convention on the Means of
Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and Transfer of
Ownership of Cultural Property (the UNESCO Convention)."' The
UNESCO Convention responded to "the growing international concern that
the high demand for cultural objects in the art market had generated
rampant pillaging of archaeological and ethnological heritage.""' To
assuage international concern, the treaty obliged its signatories to adopt
import restrictions on art objects mirroring the export restrictions of other
signatories." 4 Therefore, the internationalist solution to the rampant
pillaging of archaeological sites was to empower national governments to
keep them safe.
ii. The Cultural Property Laws of the Turkish Republic
One of the immediate tasks of the new Republic of Turkey was "to
construct a national identity.""' Concern for national identity had been a
theme in the Ottoman Empire from the early twentieth century,"l6 and
became of utmost importance for Mustafa Kemal Atatfirk and the founders
of the new republic." 7 In particular, the founders of the new republic
111. U.N. Charter art. 1.
112. UNESCO Convention, supra note 110.
113. United States Information Agency, Information on U.S. Assistance under the Convention
of Cultural Property Implementation Act 2 (1986).
114. UNESCO Convention. See Leah A. Hofkin, The Cultural Property Act: The Art of
Compromise, 12 COLUM.-VLA J. L.& ARTS 423 (1988).
115. JAMES CUNO, WHO OWNS ANTIQUITY 75 (2008).
116. LEWIS, supra note 26, at 326-27, 352-53.
117. ld. at353.
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wanted to be distinct from the Ottoman Empire.'18 At the same time, the
Turkish Republic adopted the 1906 Ottoman Decree on Antiquities (this
law was replaced by a similar law in 1973 and updated in 1983 to include
additional cultural properties) which declared that all cultural property
found in or on public land was the property of the national government." 9
Combining the search for a national identity with control over cultural
property caused archaeology in Turkey to be "much more related to the
ideology of the modem Republic than to the existing archaeological
potential of the country."' 2 Professor Mehmet Ozdogan of Istanbul
University notes:
The emergence and the development of archaeology in Turkey took
place under constraints that are deeply rooted in history.
Confrontation between the traditional Islamic framework and the
Western model, the endeavor to survive as a non-Arabic nation in
the Middle East while the Empire was disintegrating, the hostile
and occasionally humiliating attitude of Europeans, and growing
nationalism have all been consequential in this development.' 2
The Turkish government has used the control given to it by the 1906
Decree and its progeny to effect the removal of Armenian cultural property
from within its borders. 22 In all parts of the Ottoman Empire under Turkish
control, except Istanbul, "genocide has [been] persistently pursued by either
destroying all Armenian cultural remains or depriving them of their
distinguishing national elements.' 23
The relevant destruction of Armenian cultural property has been done
by willful neglect and the encouragement of trespassing by the local
Turkish population.'24 The Church of St. Sarkiss, located in the Turkish
province of Kars, was severely damaged by an earthquake in 1935,125 and
only fragments of masonry walls remain.'26 The material of the mined
Church of Holy Ejmiacin at Soradir 27 has been used by the local Turkish
population in the construction of a storehouse for feed or hay for their
118. CUNO,supra note 115, at75.
119. Id. at 82.
120. Mehmet Ozdogan, Ideology and Archaeology in Turkey, in ARCHAEOLOGY UNDER FIRE:
NATIONALISM, POLITICS, AND HERITAGE IN THE EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN AND MIDDLE EAST
113 (Lynn Meskell ed.,Routledge 1998).
121. Id. at 113.
122. Kouymjian, supra note 108.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. See Tekor in Index of Armenian Art: Armenian Architecture, http://armenianstudies.
csufresno.edu/ iaaarchitecture/tekor.htm (last visited Apr. 14, 2010).
126. Kouymjian, supra note 108.
127. See Soradir in Index of Armenian Art: Armenian Architecture, http://armenianstudies.
csufresno.edu/ iaa architecture/soradir.htm (last visited Apr. 14, 2010).
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animals. l2' A third example is the Holy Apostle Cathedral in Kars.129 The
building-considered one of the jewels of Armenian architecture-was
converted to a mosque in 1999.'
Armenian cultural property has been destroyed by a failure to provide
adequate maintenance; the best examples of which are the Cathedrals of
Ani and Aghtamar.'3 ' The Cathedral of Aghtamar-a church considered
unlike any other in the world-was an important See of the Armenian
Church; 132 today nothing but the dilapidated exterior of the church
remains.'33 The Cathedral of Ani-the medieval capital of Armenia-was
destroyed by an earthquake in 1988.134 Turkish authorities ignored the
damage done to the Cathedral, focusing on restoring the Islamic structures
of Ani.135
LEGAL THEORY
The United States founds this Application on the jus cogens norm
prohibiting genocide, on the Genocide Convention, and on the customary
international law of genocide.
SUMMARY OF THE LEGAL THEORY
Genocide is a crime under international law. The Genocide Convention
controls this dispute because the United States and the Republic of Turkey
are signatories to the convention. What is at issue is the definition of
genocide set out in the Genocide Convention. The definition is unduly
limited. It excludes genocidal acts. The customary international law of
genocide encompasses eliminationist actions directed at people for political,
economic, and cultural reasons.
Jus cogens norms are based on customary international law. The jus
cogens norm of genocide includes eliminationist actions directed at people
for political, economic, and cultural reasons. Jus cogens norms have an
impact on the interpretation of treaty law, since treaty provisions
inconsistent with jus cogens norms are not valid law. Therefore, the
128. Kouymjian, supra note, 108.
129. See Kars in Index of Armenian Art: Armenian Architecture, http://armenianstudies.
csufresno.edu/ iaa architecture/kars.htm (last visited Apr. 14, 2010).
130. Kouymjian, supra note 108.
131. Id.
132. See Aghtamar in Index of Armenian Art: Armeanian Architecture. http://armenianstudies.
csufresno.edu/iaaarchitecture/aghtamar.htm (last visited Apr. 14, 2010).
133. Dickran Kouymjian, supra note 108.
134. See Ani Cathedral in Index of Armenian Art: Armenian Architecture. http://armenian
studies.csufresno.edu/iaa-architecture/ani.htm (last visited Apr. 14, 2010).
135. Dickran Kouymjian, supra note 108. Ani was the site of the first Seljuk mosque in
Anatolia.
No. 2]
154 UNIV. OF ST. THOMAS JOURNAL OF LAW & PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. IV
definition of genocide set out in the Genocide Convention must be
interpreted as being consistent with thejus cogens norm of genocide.
The definition of genocide set out in the Genocide Convention is
inconsistent with the jus cogens norm of genocide because it excludes
forms of genocide included in the jus cogens norm. As a result, the
Genocide Convention definition should be interpreted as including every
facet of thejus cogens norms.
The jus cogens prohibition of genocide encompasses the post-1948
cultural property policies followed by the Republic of Turkey with regard to
Armenian cultural patrimony. These cultural policies are properly
understood as part of a century-long eliminationist program. Evidence of
pre-1948 actions is offered not to prove genocide occurred in the early
twentieth century but to prove the character of post-1948 actions. On this
theory, the United States holds the Republic of Turkey responsible for acts
of cultural genocide committed after 1948 at five sites: the Church of St.
Sarkiss in the province of Kars, the Church of Holy Ejmiacin at Soradir, the
Cathedral of the Holy Apostles in Kars, the Armenian Cathedral of Ani, and
the Cathedral of Aghtamar.
A. GENOCIDE IS CRIMINALIZED UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW IN
THREE DIFFERENT WA YS.
Genocide is a violation of jus cogens norms, customary international
law, and international treaty law. These three bodies of law constitute
separate sources of obligations for states, each having a "separate
existence." '36 For example, state obligations under customary international
law are not limited by treaties.'37 Therefore, states are prohibited from
committing acts of genocide byjus cogens, treaty law, and customary law.
1. Jus cogens norms and genocidal acts.
Acts of genocide violate jus cogens norms. Jus cogens norms are norms
"accepted and recognized by the international community of States as a
whole as a norm from which no derogation is permitted and which can be
modified only by a subsequent norm of general international law having the
same character."' 38 The principal purpose ofjus cogens is "to maintain the
integrity of the fundamental norms of international law and set limits on
how far States and other subjects of international law can go in treating
136. Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14 (June 27) (Summary
of the Judgment).
137. Beth V. Schaack, The Crime of Political Genocide: Repairing the Genocide Convention's
Blind Spot, 106 YALE L.J., 2259, 2274-77 (1997).
138. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 53, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 333
[hereinafter Vienna Convention].
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each other." '139 Jus cogens obligations trump treaty obligations, rendering
inconsistent provisions null and void.'40
The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Article 53, is the only
convention that recognizes the transcendent authority ofjus cogens, but this
does not mean that this transcendent effect is limited to treaties. 4 ' Indeed, it
ranges far outside the scope of the law of treaties.4 2 The fact thatjus cogens
norms render conflicting clauses of a treaty invalid necessarily means that
the underlying acts themselves are invalid.'43 This is consistent with the
International Law Commission's observation that "a rule ofjus cogens is an
overriding rule depriving any act or situation which is in conflict with it of
legality."'" Therefore, the Vienna Convention's prohibition of derogation
ofjus cogens should be construed broadly, encompassing acts as well as
treaties. 4 1
The principles that prohibit acts of genocide "are principles which are
recognized by civilized nations as binding on States, even without any
conventional obligation."'' 46 Because of this, the ICJ has held the crime of
genocide to be ajus cogens norm. 147 This view has been implicitly endorsed
by the UN Security Council'48 and explicitly endorsed by the International
Criminal Tribunals for Rwanda'49 and Yugoslavia. 50
2. Customary international law prohibits states from committing
genocidal acts.
Genocide is prohibited under customary international law. International
139. ALEXANDER ORAKHELASHVILI, PEREMPTORY NORMS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 1
(2006).
140. Vienna Convention, supra note 138.
141. ORAKHELASHVILI, supra note 139, at 205-06.
142. Id. See JENNINGS, GENERAL COURSE OF PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, II RDC
(1967), 564; See also Allain, Thejus cogens Nature of non-refoulement, 13 INT'L JOURNAL OF
REFUGEE LAW 535 (2002).
143. Suy, The Concept of Jus Cogens in International Law, in LAGONISSI CONFERENCE:
PAPERS AND PROCEEDINGS CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE 75 (1967).
144. See Draft Report of the Commission on its Eighteenth Session, Commentary on Article
37: Treaties Conflicting with a Peremptory Norm of International Law, 2 YBILC 309 (Jul. 14,
1966).
145. JAMES CRAWFORD, CREATION OF STATES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 82 (1979).
146. Reservations to the Convention on Prevention and Punishment of Genocide, Advisory
Opinion, 1951 I.C.J. 24 (May 28). [hereinafter Reservations].
147. Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (New Application 2002) (Democratic
Republic of the Congo v. Rwanda) 2002 I.C.J. 29 (Feb. 3, 2006); See M. Cherif Bassiouni,
International Criminal Justice in Historical Perspective: The Tension Between State's Interests
and the Pursuit of International Justice, in THE OXFORD COMPANION TO INTERNATIONAL
JUSTICE 131 (Antioio Cassese ed., Oxford University Press 2009).
148. See The Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragrapgh 2 of
Security Council Resolution 808. U,N. Doc S/25704 (May 3, 1993).
149. See Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR 96-4-T, Judgment, T 495 (Sept. 2, 1998).
150. See Prosecutor v. Krstic, Case No. IT-98-33, Judgment, 541 (Aug. 2, 2001).
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custom is evidenced by "general practice accepted as law."' 51 Thus, there
are two elements of international custom: generality of practice and opinio
juris et necessitatis."'52 Here, the general practice of civilized nations is to
prohibit acts of genocide." 3 From the Paris Peace Conference of 1919'14 to
today,'55 the community of civilized nations has recognized the need to
protect minority groups from genocidal acts. Furthermore, disputes arising
out of the treatment of minorities were to be resolved as a matter of
international law: such disputes were to be referred to the Permanent Court
of International Justice (PCIJ).'5 6 This conviction has carried through to
today with the establishment of the International Criminal Tribunal for the
former Yugoslavia (ICTY)5 7 and the International Criminal Tribunal for
Rwanda (ICTR).'58 The existence of these tribunals shows that the
prohibition on genocidal acts is made from a sense of legal obligation rather
than courtesy, fairness, or morality; the prohibition is opinio juris'59
Therefore, customary international law prohibits states from committing
genocidal acts.
3. International treaty law prohibits states from committing genocidal
acts.
The Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide of 1948 is the law-making treaty that affirms the international
151. Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 38(1)(b), June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1031
T.S. No. 993.
152. IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 7-10 (6th ed., 2003) (1966).
153. Reservations, supra note 146.
154. 'Poland agrees that the stipulations in the foregoing Articles, so far as they affect persons
belonging to racial, religious, or linguistic minorities, constitute obligations of international
concern and shall be placed under the guarantee of the League of Nations.Treaty of Peace between
the United States of America, the British Empire, France, Italy, and Japan, and Poland, art. XII
(June 28, 1919)(emphasis added); see Carole Fink, Minority Rights as an International Question,
9 CONTEMPORARY EUROPEAN HISTORY 3, 385-400 (2000)(discussing the plight of German
minorities in Poland after World War I).
155. See Genocide Convention, supra note 1.
156. Id.
157. Statute of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for
Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former
Yugoslavia Since 1991, S.C. Res. 827, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3217th mtg., art. 5, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/827 (1993), amended by S.C. Res. 1166, U.N. SCOR, 53rd Sess., 3878th mtg., U.N. Doc.
S/RES/1 166 (1998) [hereinafter ICTY Statute].
158. Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible
for Genocide and Other Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the
Territory of Rwanda and Rwandan Citizens Responsible for Genocide and Other Such Violations
Committed in the Territory of Neighboring States, Between 1 January 1994 and 31 December
1994, S.C. Res. 955, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3453d mtg., art. 3, U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (1994),
amended by S.C. Res. 1165, U.N. SCOR, 53rd Sess., 3877th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1 165 (1998)
[hereinafter ICTR Statute].
159. BROWNLIE, supra note 152, at 8.
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norm prohibiting acts of genocide. 6 ° Under Article 1, the contracting
parties to the Genocide Convention recognize genocide as a crime under
international law and pledge themselves to prevent and punish it. 6' While it
is a minority opinion, Article X of the Genocide Convention should be
read as applying to disputes regarding the fulfillment of the Genocide
Convention.'62 Therefore, contracting parties should be held responsible for
failing to fulfill their duties under the Genocide Convention.
B. THE GENOCIDE CONVENTION'S DEFINITION OF GENOCIDE
UNDULY LIMITS THE CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW
DEFINITION OF GENOCIDE.
In 1948, the United Nations drafted a definition of genocide for the
Genocide Convention.'63 Article II of the Genocide Convention describes
genocide as follows:
[G]enocide means any of the following acts committed with the
intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or
religious group, as such: (a) Killing members of the group; (b)
Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; (c)
Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to
bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part; (d)
Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; (e)
Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group."6
This definition expands the concept of genocide set out in the so-called
London Charter that established the Nuremburg tribunals.'65 There,
genocide was limited to acts involving an international war. 166 The
Genocide Convention remedies this limitation by expanding the crime of
genocide to include acts committed "in time of peace or in time of war."'
167
The International Criminal Court,168 the International Criminal Tribunal for
Rwanda, 169  and the International Criminal Tribunal for the former
160. Genocide Convention, supra note 1.
161. Id.
162. Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v.
Uganda) (dissenting opinion, Koroma, J.) para 4.
163. Genocide Convention, supra note 1.
164. Id.
165. See United Nations, Charter of the International Military Tribunal - Annex to the
Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the European Axis
art. 6(c), Aug. 8,1945, 5 U.N.T.S. 251.
166. See THOMAS W. SIMON, THE LAWS OF GENOCIDE: PRESCRIPTION FOR A JUST WORLD 51
(2007).
167. Genocide Convention, supra note 1, at art. 1.
168. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, adopted by the United Nations
Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal
Court, July 17, 1998, 37 I.L.M. 999 (hereinafter Rome Statute].
169. Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda art. 2.
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Yugoslavia'7 ° use this expanded definition from the Genocide Convention.
While the Convention's definition has been accepted by international
tribunals, some scholars do not consider it to be sufficiently
comprehensive.' 7 ' It does not encompass groups killed for political
affiliation (such as the communist Indonesians in 1965) or economic
position (such as the Russian kulaks slaughtered by the Soviets).'" It also
does not include forced cultural homogenization despite the fact that
genocidal acts "almost always substantially homogenize a country .... The
perpetrators often destroy and expel people precisely because they bear
despised or rival cultural ideas and practices. This is particularly evident
when religion is the impetus for one leadership and group to slaughter or
eliminate another."'17
3
Raphael Lemkin, the legal architect of Genocide Convention,
recognized the connection between cultural homogenization and genocide.
Lemkin understood genocide as "a coordinated plan of different actions
aiming at the destruction of essential foundations of the life of national
groups, with the aim of annihilating the groups themselves.... Genocide is
directed against the national group as an entity, and the actions involved are
directed against individuals, not in their individual capacity, but as
members of the national group."'74 The Genocide Convention is silent about
collective or community rights.
This connection was picked up by the international community and the
PCIJ during the interwar period. Through treaties, national minorities were
entitled to equal civil and political rights'75 and the rights to establish,
control, and manage their own "charitable, religious and social institutions,
schools and other educational establishments, with the right to use their
own language and to exercise their religion freely therein."' 76 This scheme
was designed to perpetuate "the essence of the minority's cultural identity
within the State but with its members being loyal fellow-citizens."' 77
Cultural identity and cultural rights were central to protecting minorities
from being eliminated by the majority group. 78
170. Statute of the International Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia art. 4.
171. DANIEL JONAH GOLDHAGEN, WORSE THAN WAR: GENOCIDE, ELIMINATIONISM, AND
THE ONGOING ASSAULT ON HUMANITY 26 (2009).
172. Id. at 137-40.
173. Id. at 140.
174. RAPHAEL LEMKIN, AXIS RULE IN OCCUPIED 79 (Joseph Perkovich ed., The Lawbook
Exchange, LTD. 2005) (emphasis added).
175. Rights of Minorities in Upper Silesia (Minority Schools), 1928 PCIJ (ser. A) No. 15. at 29
(Apr. 26).
176. Article 67, Section V, Treaty of Peace between the Allied and Associated Powers and
Austria, St Germain-en-Laye, Sept. 10, 1919, in force Nov. 8, 1921.
177. Ana Filipa Vrdoljak, Minorities, Cultural Rights, and the Protection of Intangible
Cultural Heritage, http://www.esil-sedi.eu/fichiers/en/Vrdoljak 0 036.pdf
178. See Minority Schools in Albania, 1935 PCUI. (ser. A/B) No. 64, at 17 (Apr. 6).
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Thus, the customary law of genocide, from conception, has
encompassed more than the definition set out in the Genocide Convention:
namely collective cultural rights. By limiting the definition of genocide to
acts perpetrated against individuals, the Genocide Convention cannot fulfill
its stated aim of punishing and preventing the "acts committed with the
intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious
group."'79 The Genocide Convention's definition of genocide must
encompass the collective cultural patrimony of minority groups.
C. THE CUSTOMARY LAW DEFINITION OF GENOCIDE SHOULD BE
THE DEFINITION APPLICABLE TO THE JUS COGENS
PROHIBITION ON GENOCIDE
A Jus cogen norm is "accepted and recognized by the international
community of States as a whole as a norm from which no derogation is
permitted and which can be modified only by a subsequent norm of general
international law having the same character."' 8° Here, genocide is
recognized as ajus cogens norm. The principal purpose ofjus cogens is "to
maintain the integrity of the fundamental norms of international law and set
limits on how far States and other subjects of international law can go in
treating each other."'' Here, the limiting definition of the Genocide
Convention does not allow for the maintenance of the integrity of
fundamental norms of international law: a people can be eliminated from a
defined area, yet that genocidal act can fall outside the Genocide
Convention. The norm prohibiting genocide must cover such genocidal acts
resulting in cultural homogenization, or it fails its purpose. Thejus cogens
norm does not prohibit most genocidal acts while admitting some.
Therefore, a proper understanding of the jus cogens norm prohibiting
genocide includes the destruction of cultural property with the intent to
eliminate that culture from an area.
Jus cogens obligations trump inconsistent treaty obligations, rendering
inconsistent provisions null and void.'82 Here, the definition of genocide in
the Genocide Convention is inconsistent with the jus cogens norm
prohibiting genocide. It is inconsistent because it excludes acts that have
come to be understood as genocide. Jus cogens norms are non-derogable,'83
thus the contracting parties may not contract to exclude certain forms of
genocide. Therefore, the treatment of the definition of genocide in the
Genocide Convention is the replacement of the provided definition with the
jus cogens norm.
179. Genocide Convention, supra note 1, at art. 2.
180. Vienna Convention, supra note 138, at art. 53.
181. ORAKHELASHVILI, supra note 139, at 1.
182. Vienna Convention, supra note 138, at art. 53.
183. CRAWFORD, supra 145, at 82.
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D. CONCLUSION
The overarching intent of the Turkish state-from 1850 to the
present-has been to strengthen the Turkish state by eliminating rival
cultures from its territory. The Turkish state has engaged in a systemic mass
annihilation and elimination of Armenian individuals and Armenian culture.
This systemic, eliminationist policy is continued by the Republic of
Turkey's destructive cultural property policies. The evidence for this can be
seen at the Church of St. Sarkiss in the province of Kars, the Church of
Holy Ejmiacin at Soradir, the Cathedral of the Holy Apostles in Kars, the
Armenian Cathedral of Ani, and the Cathedral of Aghtamar.
The customary international law of genocide, echoed in the jus cogens
prohibition against genocide, encompasses the destruction of cultural
property in furtherance of eliminating a people from a given area.
Therefore, the jus cogens norm prohibiting genocide is applicable to the
Armenian case.
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
As members of the United Nations, the United States and the Republic
of Turkey are parties to the Statute of the International Court of Justice. 1
84
Article 36, paragraph 2, of the Statute of the Court provides that:
State parties to the present statute may at any time declare that they
recognize as compulsory ipso facto and without special agreement,
in relation to any other state accepting the same obligation, the
jurisdiction of the Court in all legal disputes concerning:
a. the interpretation of a treaty;
b. any question of international law;
c. the existence of any fact which, if established, would constitute a
breach of an international obligation;
d. the nature or extent of the reparation to be made for the breach of
an international obligation.
The United States and the Republic of Turkey are also parties to the
Convention on the Prevention and Prohibition of the Crime of Genocide,
from 25 November 1988 and 31 July 1950 respectively.8 5 Article IX of the
Genocide Convention provides:
Disputes between the Contracting Parties relating to the
interpretation, application or fulfillment of the present Convention,
including those relating to the responsibility of a State for genocide
184. U.N. Charter, art. 93.
185. See List D: Parties to the Genocide Convention, http://www.preventgenocide.org/law/
gencon/nonparties-by ICCstatus.htm (last visited Apr. 15, 2010).
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or any of the other acts enumerated in Article 3, shall be submitted
to the International Court of Justice at the request of any of the
parties to the dispute.
This article gives the International Court of Justice compulsory jurisdiction
in all legal disputes arising under the Genocide Convention. 86
To date, the Republic of Turkey has not entered a reservation,
declaration, or understanding regarding Article IX of the Genocide
Convention.8 7 The United States has entered a reservation to Article IX
stating "[t]hat with reference to article IX of the Convention, before any
dispute to which the United States is a party may be submitted to the
jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice under this article, the
specific consent of the United States is required in each case." '188 The United
States, as the plaintiff, consents to the jurisdiction of the Court. Therefore,
any matters in dispute between the United States and the Republic of
Turkey are subject to the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court.
CLAIMS OF THE UNITED STATES
The Government of the United States claims, in its own right and as
parens patriae of its citizens, that the Republic of Turkey as the successor
state to the Ottoman Empire and through its State organs, State agents, and
other persons and entities exercising governmental authority is responsible
for the destruction of Armenian cultural property constituting a continuation
of the Armenian Genocide. The United States respectfully requests the
Court to order the Republic of Turkey to comply with its obligations under
the Genocide Convention, the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, and the Culture Convention, including:
Taking immediate steps to preserve the churches of St. Sarkiss in Kars
and Holy Ejmiacin in Soradir, Holy Apostle Cathedral in Kars, the
Cathedral of Ani, and the Cathedral of Aghtamar.
Ensuring that Armenian cultural property uncovered during government
sanctioned digs is properly excavated and preserved.
Providing adequate facilities to house and display Armenian cultural
artifacts.
186. Although the plain language of Article IX does not reference compulsory jurisdiction,
states have considered Article IX to be a compulsory jurisdiction clause. See Reservations to
Article IX of the Genocide Convention by the China, India, Spain, and the United States,
http://www.preventgenocide.org/law/convention/reservations/ (last visited Apr. 15, 2010).
187. Id.
188. Id.
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RESERVATION OF RIGHTS
The United States reserves the right to modify and extend the terms of
this Application, as well as the grounds invoked.
APPOINTMENT OF AGENTS
The United States has designated as its Agent Mr. Simeon A. Morbey,
law student at the University of St. Thomas School of Law, Minnesota.
Pursuant to Article 40, paragraph 1, of the Rules of the Court, all
communications relating to this case should be sent to:
Mr. Simeon A. Morbey*
1000 La Salle Avenue
Minneapolis, Minnesota 55403
* BA St. John's College, Md., 2005 Philosophy and History of Science.
